The Politics (translated by Jowett)/Book 1

THE POLITICS

BOOK I

Every state is a community of some kind, and everyI. 1
Ed. Bekker
1252 a community is established with a view to some good; for mankind always act in order to obtain that which they think good. But, if all communities aim at some good, the state or political community, which is the highest of all, and which embraces all the rest, aims, and in a greater degree than any other, at the highest good.

Now there is an erroneous opinion^[1] that a statesman, king, 2 householder, and master are the same, and that they differ, not in kind, but only in the number of their subjects. For example, the ruler over a few is called a master; over more, the manager of a household; over a still larger number, a statesman or king, as if there were no difference between a great household and a small state. The distinction which is made between the king and the statesman is as follows: When the government is personal, the ruler is a king; when, according to the principles of the political science, the citizens rule and are ruled in turn, then he is called a statesman.

But all this is a mistake; for governments differ in kind, as will be evident to any one who considers the matter according to the method^[2] which has hitherto guided us. As in other departments of science, so in politics, the compound should always be resolved into the simple elements or least parts of the whole. We must therefore look at the I. 1elements of which the state is composed, in order that we may see in what they differ from one another, and whether any scientific distinction can be drawn between the different kinds of rule^[3].

2He who thus considers things in their first growth and origin, whether a state or anything else, will obtain the 2clearest view of them. In the first place (i) there must be a union of those who cannot exist without each other; for example, of male and female, that the race may continue; and this is a union which is formed, not of deliberate purpose, but because, in common with other animals and with plants, mankind have a natural desire to leave behind them an image of themselves. And (2) there must be a union of natural ruler and subject, that both may be preserved. For he who can foresee with his mind is by nature intended to be lord and master, and he who can work with his body is a subject, and 3
1252 b by nature a slave; hence master and slave have the same interest. Nature, however, has distinguished between the female and the slave. For she is not niggardly, like the smith who fashions the Delphian knife for many uses; she makes each thing for a single use, and every instrument is best made when intended for one and not for many uses.4 But among barbarians no distinction is made between women and slaves, because there is no natural ruler among them: they are a community of slaves, male and female. Wherefore the poets say,—

'It is meet that Hellenes should rule over barbarians^[4];' I. 2as if they thought that the barbarian and the slave were by nature one.

Out of these two relationships between man and woman, 5master and slave, the family first arises, and Hesiod is right when he says,—

First house and wife and an ox for the plough^[5],'

for the ox is the poor man's slave. The family is the association established by nature for the supply of men's every-day wants, and the members of it are called by Charondas 'companions of the cupboard' [ὁμοσιπύους], and by Epimenides the Cretan, 'companions of the manger^[6]' [ὁμοκάπους]. But when several families are united, and the association aims at something more than the supply of daily needs, then comes into existence the village. And the most natural 6 form of the village appears to be that of a colony from the family, composed of the children and grandchildren, who are said to be 'suckled with the same milk'. And this is the reason why Hellenic states were originally governed by kings; because the Hellenes were under royal rule before they came together, as the barbarians still are. Every family is ruled by the eldest, and therefore in the colonies of the family the kingly form of government prevailed because they were of the same blood. As Homer says [of the 7 Cyclopes]:7

'Each one gives law to his children and to his wives^[7].'

For they lived dispersedly, as was the manner in ancient I. 2 times. Wherefore men say that the Gods have a king, because they themselves either are or were in ancient times under the rule of a king. For they imagine, not only the forms of the Gods, but their ways of life to be like their own.

8When several villages are united in a single community, perfect and large enough to be nearly or quite self-sufficing, the state comes into existence, originating in the bare needs of life, and continuing in existence for the sake of a good life. And therefore, if the earlier forms of society are natural, so is the state, for it is the end of them, and the [completed] nature is the end. For what each thing is when fully developed, we call its nature, whether we are speaking 9 of a man, a horse, or a family. Besides, the final cause and end of a thing is the best, and to be self-sufficing is the end 1253 a and the best.

Hence it is evident that the state is a creation of nature, and that man is by nature a political animal. And he who by nature and not by mere accident is without a state, is either above humanity, or below it; he is the

'Tribeless, lawless, hearthless one,'

10whom Homer^[8] denounces—the outcast who is a lover of war; he may be compared to an unprotected piece in the game of draughts.

Now the reason why man is more of a political animal than bees or any other gregarious animals is evident. Nature, as we often say, makes nothing in vain ^[9], and man is the only animal whom she has endowed with the gift of 11speech^[10]. And whereas mere sound is but an indication of pleasure or pain, and is therefore found in other animals I. 2 (for their nature attains to the perception of pleasure and pain and the intimation of them to one another, and no further), the power of speech is intended to set forth the expedient and inexpedient, and likewise the just and the unjust. And it is a characteristic of man that he alone has any sense of good and evil, of just and unjust, and the association of living beings who have this sense makes a family and a state.

Thus the state is by nature clearly prior to the family and to the individual, since the whole is of necessity prior to the part; for example, if the whole body be destroyed, there will be no foot or hand, except in an equivocal sense, as we might speak of a stone hand; for when destroyed the hand will be no better. But things are defined by their working and power; and we ought not to say that they are the same when they are no longer the same, but only that they have the same name. The proof that the state is a creation of nature and prior to the individual is that the individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficing; and therefore he is like a part in relation to the whole. But he who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god: he is no part of a state. A social instinct is implanted in all men by nature, and yet he who first founded the state was the greatest of benefactors. For man, when perfected, is the best of animals, but, when separated from law and justice, he is the worst of all; since armed injustice is the more dangerous, and he is equipped at birth with the arms of intelligence and with moral qualities which he may use for the worst ends. Wherefore, if he have not virtue, he I. 2is the most unholy and the most savage of animals, and the most full of lust and gluttony. But justice is the bond of men in states, and the administration of justice, which is the determination of what is just^[11], is the principle of order in political society.

3Seeing then that the state is made up of households, before speaking of the state we must speak of the management 1253 b of the household^[12]. The parts of the household are the persons who compose it, and a complete household consists of slaves and freemen. Now we should begin by examining everything in its least elements; and the first and least parts of a family are master and slave, husband and wife, father and children. We have therefore to consider what each 2of these three relations is and ought to be: I mean the relation of master and servant, of husband and wife, and thirdly of parent and child. [I say γαμική) and τεκνοποιητική, there being no words for the two latter notions which adequately 3 represent them.] And there is another element of a household, the so-called art of money-making, which, according to some, is identical with household management, according to others, a principal part of it; the nature of this art will also have to be considered by us.

Let us first speak of master and slave, looking to the needs of practical life and also seeking to attain some better 4theory of their relation than exists at present. For some are of opinion that the rule of a master is a science, and that the management of a household, and the mastership of slaves, and the political and royal rule, as I was saying at the out set^[13], are all the same. Others affirm that the rule of a master I. 3over slaves is contrary to nature, and that the distinction between slave and freeman exists by law only, and not by nature; and being an interference with nature is therefore unjust.

4Property is a part of the household, and therefore the art of acquiring property is a part of the art of managing the household; for no man can live well, or indeed live at all, unless he be provided with necessaries. And as in the arts which have a definite sphere the workers must have their own proper instruments for the accomplishment of their work, so it is in the management of a household. 2Now, instruments are of various sorts; some are living, others lifeless; in the rudder, the pilot of a ship has a lifeless, in the look-out man, a living instrument; for in the arts the servant is a kind of instrument. Thus, too, a possession is an instrument for maintaining life. And so, in the arrangement of the family, a slave is a living possession, and property a number of such instruments; and the servant is himself an instrument, which takes precedence of all other instruments. 3For if every instrument could accomplish its own work, obeying or anticipating the will of others, like the statues of Daedalus, or the tripods of Hephaestus, which, says the poet^[14],

'of their own accord entered the assembly of the Gods';

if, in like manner, the shuttle would weave and the plectrum touch the lyre without a hand to guide them, chief workmen would not want servants, nor masters slaves. 1254 aHere, however, another distinction must be drawn: the instruments commonly4 so called are instruments of production, whilst a possession is an instrument of action. The shuttle, for I. 4example, is not only of use, but something else is made by it, whereas of a garment or of a bed there is only the use. Further, as production and action are different in kind, and both require instruments, the instruments which they 5 employ must likewise differ in kind. But life is action and not production, and therefore the slave is the minister of action [for he ministers to his master's life]. Again, a possession is spoken of as a part is spoken of; for the part is not only a part of something else, but wholly belongs to it; and this is also true of a possession. The master is only the master of the slave; he does not belong to him, whereas the slave is not only the slave of his master, 6 but wholly belongs to him. Hence we see what is the nature and office of a slave; he who is by nature not his own but another's and yet a man, is by nature a slave; and he may be said to belong to another who, being a human being, is also a possession. And a possession may be defined as an instrument of action, separable from the possessor.

5 But is there any one thus intended by nature to be a slave, and for whom such a condition is expedient and right, or rather is not all slavery a violation of nature?

There is no difficulty in answering this question, on 2 grounds both of reason and of fact. For that some should rule and others be ruled is a thing, not only necessary, but expedient; from the hour of their birth, some are marked out for subjection, others for rule.

The relations of husband and wife, parent and child, their 15several virtues, what in their intercourse with one another is good, and what is evil, and how we may pursue the good and escape the evil, will have to be discussed when we speak of the different forms of government. For, inasmuch as every family is a part of a state, and these relationships are the parts of a family, the virtue of the part must have regard to the virtue of the whole. And therefore women and children must be trained by education with an eye to the state^[16], if the virtues of either of them are supposed to make any difference in the virtues of the state. And they must make a difference:16 for the children grow up to be citizens, and half the free persons in a state are women^[17].

Of these matters, enough has been said; of what remains, 14 let us speak at another time. Regarding, then, our present enquiry as complete, we will make a new beginning. And, first, let us examine the various theories of a perfect state.

↑ Cp. Plato, Politicus, 258 E foil
↑ Cp. c. 8. § 1.
↑ Or, with Bernays, 'how the different kinds of rule differ from one another, and generally whether any scientific result can be attained about each one of them.'
↑ Eurip. Iphig. in Aulid. 1400.
↑ Op. et Di. 405.
↑ Or, reading with the old translator (William of Moerbek) ὁμοκάπνους, 'companions of the hearth.'
↑ Od. ix. 114, quoted by Plato, Laws, iii. 680, and in N. Eth. x. 9. § 13.
↑ Il. ix.63.
↑ Cp. c. 8. § 12.
↑ 3 Cp. vii. 13. § 12.
↑ Cp. N. Eth. v. 6. § 4.
↑ Reading with the MSS. οίκονομίας.
↑ Plato in Pol. 258 E foll., referred to already in c. I. § 2.
↑ 1 Hom. II. xviii. 376.
↑ Plato Laws, vi. 777.
↑ Cp. v. 9. §§ 11-15; viii. i. § 1.
↑ Plato Laws, vi. 781 B.

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[1] Cp. Plato, Politicus, 258 E foil

[2] Cp. c. 8. § 1.

[3] Or, with Bernays, 'how the different kinds of rule differ from one another, and generally whether any scientific result can be attained about each one of them.'

[4] Eurip. Iphig. in Aulid. 1400.

[5] Op. et Di. 405.

[6] Or, reading with the old translator (William of Moerbek) ὁμοκάπνους, 'companions of the hearth.'

[7] Od. ix. 114, quoted by Plato, Laws, iii. 680, and in N. Eth. x. 9. § 13.

[8] Il. ix.63.

[9] Cp. c. 8. § 12.

[10] 3 Cp. vii. 13. § 12.

[11] Cp. N. Eth. v. 6. § 4.

[12] Reading with the MSS. οίκονομίας.

[13] Plato in Pol. 258 E foll., referred to already in c. I. § 2.

[14] 1 Hom. II. xviii. 376.

[15] Plato Laws, vi. 777.

[16] Cp. v. 9. §§ 11-15; viii. i. § 1.

[17] Plato Laws, vi. 781 B.

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