its individual being in terms of its Ideal. In short,

it must be thought in terms of final cause alone. No mind can have an efficient relation to another mind; efficiency is the attribute of every mind toward its own acts and life, or toward the world of mere “things” which forms the theatre of its action; and the causal relation between minds must be that of ideality, simply and purely.

This is a religious truth so clearly fundamental that when once our attention is brought to it we cannot but give it assent. So far from denying it, we incline, rather, to say — and rightly — that we have in somewise always known it. Yet it is directly violated by our ordinary and sensuous theistic conceptions; and not until the pantheistic insight has been realised in our minds, whether by name or no it matters not, — realised even if transcended, and, indeed, only to be transcended, — do we clearly discover that this violation exists.^[1]

But while this permanent insight of pantheism must be carried up into all genuine theistic thought, it is also true that in itself the insight falls fatally

1. ↑ The preceding paragraphs have been much rewritten from the form in which they were (1885-6) originally printed, in order to remove the risk of misinterpretation in regard to the doctrine of “immanence.” Cf. the foot-note to p. 60. See also The Conception of God, pp. 97-100, 114-132, especially 131-132.