hoot low. 1 Philip, moreover, impressed upon his admiral that he must engage the enemy only if it should become apptrent that I'm'ma's passage across could not be ensured without an action.

Fca' Medin Sidoni was to spare his Spaniards as much as possible,

xSth a view to assisting I'armt with six thousand men, in case there hmfid be no battle, or with fewer, in case losses should be incurred. �' This exhortation to avoid an unnecessary action must have been rather embarrassing to the commander-in-chief, since Philip had el.ewhere directed him to figlit if Drake pro'sued, or were fallen in with near the mouth of the Channeh

If Parma landed in England, s Medina Sidonia was to station his fleet at the mouth of the Thames, and to guard that river. He would then be able to keep open and safe the communications with Flanders, and to co-operate in the most efficacious manuer.

According to the instructions, Medina Sidoni, xvas only to act independently of Parma, in the event of an action having to be fought at sea, which action was nevertheless described as being at'tar all the chief thm. Above all, he was to remain on the English coast until the business should be brought to'a satisfactory termination.

These instructions are vague and ambiguous2 The5' leave one in doubt as to what Philip really had in mindy The orders admit of the following intcq)retation.

Margate Road was to be the immediate destination of the Armada. There, for the first time, touch was to be gained with I',%t.ana, as soon as possible after the arrival of Medina Sidonia.; Philip says nothing definite as to Medina Sidonia convoylug Parma, but directs him to ensure the latter's passage across. This order is so indeterminate that one may conjectm'e that after his arrival off Ma,rgatc, the admiral might act according to circumstances. The ldng, perhaps, expected that Medina Sidonia would manage to drive the enemy from the Channel as the result of a battle fought off Margate before the fleet anchored in the Road. In that case, Pt[rma might cross without assistance. But, if the enemy still remained

Ihu'o, doe. 94, p. 10.  lb., d.c. .14, pp. 10, 11. See also Frorole, 33 I. 

lb., doc. 94, 1'- 11.  lb., doc. 94, pp. lo, 11. 

' Yet l)uro, doc. i. 1'- 48, comments: "No cab2 nada mss meditado, chu'o y preciso

ta instruccion."

h is ham that Philip had dclivered to the two dukes certain plans whivh have 

been preserved. These lnay possil,ly have l,een more l,recibe. Duro, dot'. , p. 7.

l)tu'o, doc. 95.