spirit, and every effort was made to disparage me in the eyes of both the people of the United States and those of Haiti. Strangely enough, much of this unfriendly influence came from officers of the American navy; men in the pay of the government. The appearance in the harbor of Port au Prince of United States ships of war, instead of being a support to the American Minister, was always followed by a heavy broadside against him in the American papers. Our ships seemed to be well supplied with salt water correspondents; men who had studied the science of polite detraction at the public expense and had reached in it a high degree of perfection. The arrival of an American war vessel became a source of apprehension, and an admiral's pennon in the harbor of Port au Prince was a signal of attack upon the United States Minister.

Speaking of the acquisition of the M61e St. Nicolas as a United States naval station, one of these fruitful correspondents thus exposed the real cause of complaint against me: "When by the active intervention and material aid of the States, General Hyppolite was placed in power in October, 1889, . . . American influence was paramount, and had a shrewd and capable American then been sent by the United States to conduct the negotiations so ably initiated by Rear-Admiral Gherardi, there would be a different condition of affairs to report today. At Admiral Gherardi's suggestion a new minister was sent to Port au Prince. . . . The lack of wisdom, however, displayed in the choice . . . has by the result attained become only too apparent." " Of the Clyde concession it is perhaps needless to say anything, . . . has failed completely. . . . But with the negotiations in the hands of Rear-Admiral Gherardi a decision must be reached shortly. Admiral Gherardi is sent to resuscitate the negotiations. Admiral Gherardi will succeed