in conscious experience. judgment is here merely reflective; that is to say, the particular e ement is given, so determined as to be possible material of knowledge, while the universal, not necessary for cognition, is supplied by reason itself. The empirical details of nature, which are not determined by the categories of understanding, are judged as being arranged or ordered by intelligence, for in no other fashion could nature, in its particular, contingent aspect, be thought as forming a complete, consistent, intelligible whole. The investigation of the conditions under which adaptation of nature to intelligence is conceivable and possible makes up the subject of the third great Kritik, the Kritik of Judgment, a work presenting unusual difficulties to the interpreter of the Kantian system. The general principle of the adaptation of nature to our faculties of cognition has two specific applications, with the second of which it is more closely connected than with the first. In the first place, the adaptation may be merely subjective, when the empirical condition for the exercise of judgment is furnished by the feeling of pleasure or pain; such adaptation is aesthetic. In the second place, the adaptation may be objective or logical, when empirical facts are given of such a kind that their possibility can be conceived only through the notion of the end realized in them; such adaptation is teleological, and the empirical facts in question are organisms.

Aesthetics, or the scientific consideration of the judgments resting on the feelings of pleasure and pain arising from the harmony or want of harmony between the particular of experience and the laws of understanding, is the special subject of the Kritik of Judgment, but the doctrine of teleology there unfolded is the more important for the complete view of the critical system. For the analysis of the teleological judgment and of the consequences flowing from it leads to the final statement of the nature of experience as conceived by Kant. The phenomena of organic production furnish data for a special kind of judgment, which, however, involves or rests upon a quite general principle, -that of the contingency of the particular element in nature and its subjectively necessary adaptation to our faculty of cognition. The notion of contingency arises, according to Kant, from the fact that understanding and sense are distinct, that understanding does not determine the particular of sense, and, consequently, that the principle of the adaptation of the particular to our understanding is merely supplied by reason on account of the peculiarity or limited character of understanding. End in nature, therefore, is a subjective or problematic conception, implying the limits of understanding, and consequently resting upon the idea of an understanding constituted unlike ours-of an intuitive understanding in which particular and universal should be given together. The idea of such an understanding is, for cognition, transcendent for no corresponding fact of intuition is furnished, but it is realized with practical certainty in relation to reason as practical. For we are, from practical grounds, compelled with at least practical necessity to ascribe a certain aim or end to this supreme understanding. The moral law, or reason as practical, prescribes the realization of the highest good, and such realization implies a higher order than that of nature. We must, therefore, regard the supreme cause as a moral cause, and nature as so ordered that realization of the moral end is in it possible. The final conception of the Kantian philosophy is, therefore, that of ethical teleology. As Kant expresses it in a remarkable passage of the'Kritik, “ The systematic unity -of ends in this world of intelligences, which, although as mere nature it is to be called only the world of sense, can yet as a system of freedom be called an intelligible, i.e. moral world (regnum gratiae), leads inevitably to the teleological unity of all things which constitute this great whole according to universal natural laws, just as the unity of the former is according to universal and necessary moral laws, and unites the practical with the speculative reason. The world must be represented as having originated from an idea, if it is to harmonize with that use of reason without which we should hold ourselves unworthy of reason-viz. the moral use, which rests entirely on the idea of the supreme good. Hence all natural research tends towards the form of a system of ends, and in its highest development would be a physico-theology. But this, since it arises from the moral order as a unity grounded in the very essence of freedom and not accidentally instituted by external commands, establishes the teleology of nature on grounds which a priori must be inseparably connected with the inner possibility of things. The teleology of nature is thus made to rest on a transcendental theolOgY, which takes the ideal of supreme ontological perfection as a principle of systematic unity, a principle which connects all things according to universal and necessary natural laws, since ghey all have their origin in the absolute necessity of a single primal ein " . 8

g (P 53 >-

B1BL10G RA PHY.-Editions and works of reference are exceedingly numerous. Since 1896 an indispensable guide is the periodical review Kantstudien (Hamburg and Berlin, thrice yearly), edited by Hans Vaihinger and Bruno Bauch, which contains admirable original articles and notices of all important books on Kant and number of striking portraits of

Erich Adickes in Philosophical

1890-1894 R. Reicke's Kant

general the latest edition of

Kantianism. It has reproduced a

Kant. For books up to 1887 see

Review (Boston, 1892 f0ll.); »for

Bibliographie (1895). See also in

Ueberweg's Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie. EDITIONS.*COmpl€t€ editions of Kant's works are as follows: (1) G. Hartenstein (Lei zig, 1838-1839, IO vols.); (2) K. Rosenkranz and F. W. Schubert (Leipzig, 1838-1840, 12 vols., the 12th containing a history of the Kantian school); (3) G. Hartenstein, “in chronological order " (Leipzig, 1867-1869, 8 v0ls.); (4) Kirchmann (in the “ Philosophische Bibliothek, " Berlin, 1868-1873, 8 vols. and supplement); (5) under the auspices of the Koniglich Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften a new collected edition was begun in 1900 (vol. ii., 1906) in charge of a number of editors. It was planned in four sections: Works, Letters, MSS. Remains and Vorlesungen. There are also useful editions of the three Kritiks by Kehrbach, and critical editions of the Prolegomena and Kritik der reinen Vernunft by B. Erdmann (see also his Beitrdge zur Geschichte und Revision des Textes von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1900). A useful selection (in English) is that of John Watson, The Philosophy of Kant (Glasgow, 1888).

TRANSLATIONS.*ThEf€ are translations in all the principal languages. The chief English translators are J. P. Mahaffy, . Hastie, T. K. Abbott, J. H. Bernard and Belfort Bax. Their versions have been mentioned in the section on “ Works ” above. BIOGRAPHICAL.—Schubert in the 11th vol. of Rosenkranz's edition; Borowski, Darstellung des Lebens und Charakters Kants (Konigsberg, 180); Vilasianski, Kant in seinen letzten Lebensjahren (Konigsberg, 1804);Stuckenberg, The Life of Immanuel Kant (1882); Rudolf Reicke, Kants Briefwechsel (1900). See also several of the critical works below. On Kant's portraits see D. Minden, Ueber Portraits und Abbildungen Imm. Kants (1868) and cf. frontispieces of Kontstudien (as above).

CRITICAL (in alphabetical order of authors).-R. Adamson, Philosophy of Kant (1879; Germ. trans., 1880); Felix Adler, A Critique of Kant's Ethics (1908); S. Aicher, Kants Begrif der Erkenntnis v erg lichen mit dem des Aristoteles (1907); M. Apel, Immanuel Kant: Ein Bild seines Lebens und Denkens (1904) § Arnoldt, Kritische Exkurse im Gebiete der Kantforschung (1894); C. Bache, “Kants Prinzip der Autonomie im Verhdltnis zur I dee des Reichs der Zwecke " (Kantstudien, 1909); B. Bauch, Luther und Kant (1904); Paul Boehm, Die oorkritischen Schriften Kants (1906); E. Caird, Critical Philosophy of Kant (2 vols., 1889); Chalybaus, Historische Entwickelung der spekulativen Philosophie von Kant bis Hegel (5th ed., 1860); H. S. Chamberlain, Immanuel Kant (1909); Cousin, Legons sur la philosophies de Kant (4th ed., 1864); B. Erdmann, Immanuel Kant, Kants Kritizismus in der 1 und 2 Aujlage der “ Kritik der reinen Vernunft ”(1877); O. Ewald, Kants /eritischer Idealismus als Grundlage von Erkenntnistheorie und Ethik (1908) and Kants M etlzodologie in ihren Grundzilgen (1906); Kuno Fischer, Immanuel Kant (4th ed., 1898-1 899), Die beiden Kontischen Schulen in Jena (1862), and Commentary on Kant's Kritik of Pure Reason (1878); F. F firster, Der Entwicklungsgan der Kantischen Ethik bis zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1893); A. Touillée, Le Moralisme de Kant et Vamorolisme contemporaine (1905); C. R. E. von Hartmann, Kants Erkenntnistheorie und M etaphysik in den vier Perioden ihrer Entwickelung (1894); A. Hegler, Die Psychologie in Kants Ethik (1891); G. D. Hicks, Die Begrife Phdnomenon und Noumenon in ihrem Verhdltniss zu einander bei Kant (1897); G. Jacoby, Herders und Kants Aesthetik (1907); W. Kabitz, Studien zur Entwickelungsgeschichte der Fichteschen Wissensehaftslehre aus der Kantischen Philosophie (1902); M. Kelly, Kant's Philosophy as rectified by Schopenhauer (1909); W. Koppelmann, I. Kant und die Grundlagen der christlichen Religion (1890); M. Kronenberg, Kant: Sein Leben und seine Lehre (1897; 3rd ed., 1905); E. Kiihnemann, Kants und Schillersf Begrilndung der Aesthetik (1895) and Die Kantischen Studien Schillers und die Komposition des Wallenstein (1839); H. Levy, Kants Lehre vom Schematismus der reinen Verstandesbegrife (1901); Arthur O. Lovejoy, Kant and the English Platonists (1908); ]. P. Mahaffy, Kant's Critical Philosophy for English Readers (1872-1374); W. Mengel, Kants Begrundung der Religion (1900); A. Messer, Kants Ethik (1904); H. Meyer-Benfey, Herder und Kant (1904); Morris, Kant's' Critique of Pure Reason (Chicago, 1882); C. Oesterreich, Kant und die Metaphysik (1906); F. Paulsen, Kant: Sein Leben und seine Lehre (1898; 4th ed., 1?04; Eng. 1902); Harold H. Prichard, Kant's Theory of Know edge (1909); A. Seth Pringle-Pattison, The Development from Kant to Hegel (1882); and, on Kant's philosophy of religion, in The Philosophic Radicals (1907); F. Rademaker, Kants Lehren vom innern Sinn in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1908); R. Reininger, Kants Lehre 'vom inneren Sinn und seine Theorie der Erfahrung (1900); C. B. Renouvier, Critique de la doctrine de Kant (1906); H. Romundt, K ants philosophischeReligionslehre eine Fruchtdergesammten Vernunftkritik (1902); T. Ruyssen, Kant (1900); E. Saenger, Kants Lehrer/om Glauben (1903) 2 O. Schapp, Kants Lehre vom Genie, und die Entstehung der “ Kritik der Urteilskraft ” (1901); Carl Schmidt, Beitrdge zur Entwickelung der Kant'schen Ethik (1900); A. Schweitzer, Die Religionsphilosophie Kants (1899); H. Sidgwick, Lectures on the Philosophy of Kant (1905); H. Stirling, Text Book to Kant (1881); G. Simmel, Kant und Goette (1906); L. Staehlin, Kant, Lotze und Ritschl (1889); O. Thon, Die Grundprinzipien der Kantischen Moralphilosophie (1895); T. Valentiner, Kant und die platonische Philosophie (1904); C. Vorlanderf Kant, Schiller, Goethe (1907); G. C. Uphues, Kant und sein Vorgdnger (1906); W. Wallace, Kant (1905): M. Wartenberg, Kants Theorie der Kausalitdt (1899); John Watson,

Philosophy of Kant Explained (1908), Kant and his English Critics