THE BEGINNINGS OF OWNERSHIP 355

with our preconceptions, would look upon the relation of the primitive savage or barbarian to his slight personal effects as a relation of ownership, but whether that is his own apprehension of the matter. It is a question as to the light in which the sav- age himself habitually views these objects that pertain immedi- ately to his person and are set apart for his habitual use. Like all questions of the derivation of institutions, it is essentially a question of folk-psychology, not of mechanical fact; and, when so conceived, it must be answered in the negative.

The unsophisticated man, whether savage or civilized, is prone to conceive phenomena in terms of personality ; these being terms with which he has a first-hand acquaintance. This habit is more unbroken in the savage than in civilized men. All obvious manifestations of force are apprehended as expressions of conation — effort put forth for a purpose by some agency similar to the human will. The point of view of the archaic culture is that of forceful, pervading personality, whose unfold- ing life is the substantial fact held in view in every relation into which men or things enter. This point of view in large measure shapes and colors all the institutions of the early culture — and in a less degree the later phases of culture. Under the guidance of this habit of thought, the relation of any individual to his personal effects is conceived to be of a more intimate kind than that of ownership simply. Ownership is too external and color- less a term to describe the fact.

In the apprehension of the savage and the barbarian the limits of his person do not coincide with the limits which mod- ern biological science would recognize. His individuality is conceived to cover, somewhat vaguely and uncertainly, a pretty wide fringe of facts and objects that pertain to him more or less immediately. To our sense of the matter these items lie outside the limits of his person, and to many of them we would con- ceive him to stand in an economic rather than in an organic relation. This quasi-personal fringe of facts and objects com- monly comprises the man's shadow; the reflection of his image

in water or any similar surface; his name; his peculiar tattoo