men united together," it is plain that, if there be such a as the "law of nature," whieh men as individuals are bound to obey, that law is also obligatory on the "societics" made up of me thus "united."

thing Hobbes divides the law of nature into that of man and that of States, saying, "The maxims of cach of these laws are pre- ciscly the sane; but as States, once established, assume per- sonal properties, that which is termed the natural law when we speak of the duties of individuals is called the law of nations when applied to whole nations or States." The Emperor Justinian said, "The law of nations is common to the whole human race."

Grotius draws the distinction between the law of nature and the law of nations thus: "When several persons at different times and in various places maintain the same thing as certain, such coincidence of seutiment must be attributed to some gen- eral cause. Now, in the questions before us, that cause must necessarily be one or the other of these two-either a just sequence drawn from natural principles, the former discovers to us the law of natnre, and the latter the cOn or a universal conseut; law of nations."

Vattel defines the "necessary law of nations" to be the "ap- plication of the law of nature to nations." necessary,' because nations are absolutcly boutnd to observe it. This law contains the preeepts preseribed by the law of nature He says: "It is to States, on whom that law is not less obligatory than on indi- viduals; since States are composed of men, their resolutions are taken by men, and the law of nations is binding undcr whatever relation they act. Grotins, and thosc who follow him, call the Internal Law of on all men, This is the law which Nations, an acconnt of its being obligatory on nations in the point of conscienee."

Vattel says again: "Nations being composed of men naturally free and independent, and who before the establishment of