< On the Vital Principle < Book 3

-- Chapter 11 --

LET us now consider the motor power in such imperfect creatures as have only the sense of Touch; and learn whether or not it is admissible that imagination and desire can be present with them. Now, they do appear to be sensible of pain and pleasure, and if so far sensible, they must of necessity have desire. But how can imagination be present in them? It may, perhaps, be answered that, as their movements are indeterminate, so those sensations are present, but present in some indeterminate manner.

The sentient imagination belongs, as has been said, to other animals, but that which is voluntary is found only in such as are rational; for it is matter of calculation whether this or that shall be done, and as the individual is to pursue what is larger and better, he must be guided by a rule of some kind, and thereby be enabled to individualize several different images. The reason why these creatures do not seem to be capable of forming opinions is, that they are without the faculty for drawing inferences, and this includes opinion. But the appetite has no deliberative will, as appetite sometimes overcomes and impels the will, and sometimes the will overcomes and impels the appetite, as a ball is bandied to and fro; or appetite rules and impels appetite, when intemperance has the ascendancy. But that which is superior is ever naturally more dominant, and productive of motion in three different directions; but the intelligent faculty has no motion—it remains at rest. Although the conception of the universal is to be distinguished from the conception of the particular, (for while the former says that such an one ought to perform such an act, the latter says that such an one, and that I am he, ought now to perform this particular act,) yet it is this latter opinion rather than the former which impels to move; and although both may be motive, the one, at least, is rather at rest, and the other is rather in motion.

Notes

​Note 1, p. 182. The sentient imagination belongs, &c.] Instinct is the fixed but unerring guide of the lower animals; the voluntary imagination, on the other hand, the faculty, that is, which can, at will, be called up and supply images for selection and combination by the judgment, can belong only to beings endowed with reason—that is, to man. The faculties associated with this imagination, enable the individual, by idealising a measure, to select what may be, relatively, larger and better, and out of several impressions or sensations, to form general notions. It is unnecessary to follow the argument which explains why these creatures, so low in the scale, cannot form opinions.

Note 2, p. 182. But appetite has no deliberative will, &c.] The meaning of this passage is, seemingly, too ​obvious to require comment; but some commentators have in the term σφαῖρα seen an allusion to the celestial spheres, rather than a ball, because, as the upper controls in its movements the lower sphere, so reason, being superior to appetite, is to control inordinate desires. "Quibus collatis, non temerarium erit, σφαίρας similitudinem ita interpretari: consilium tanquam superius (ἡ ἄυω) ita appetitum in suum motum convertere, sicut superior sphæra eas, quœ inferiores volvuntur." The words which follow "that which is superior is ever naturally more dominant," may require some such interpretation, for they seem to imply that motion, by translation, may be derived from the motions of the spheres above, which were said to be in three directions; but the knowing faculty, the mind, that is, like the first motor, is, for ever, at rest.

Note 3, p. 183. Although the conception of the universal, &c.] This abstruse passage can only be understood by reference to the special treatise upon "the motion of animals, wherein this topic is considered;" it is asked, "whence comes it, that an individual, after thinking, sometimes acts and sometimes does not act, sometimes moves and sometimes does not move?" and the answer[1] is, that "action or motion is the conclusion of a syllogism," of which "the conception of the universal is the major, that of the particular, the middle, and the action following it the minor."

  1. ↑ De Motu Animalm, 5. 7. 1.
    This article is issued from Wikisource. The text is licensed under Creative Commons - Attribution - Sharealike. Additional terms may apply for the media files.