< A Century of American Diplomacy


THE joint resolution for the admission of Texas as a State of the Union was passed in the closing days of the Tyler administration, but the final act of admission had to be taken by President Polk. There was every reason to believe that Mexico was in earnest in its notice that the annexation would be held as an act of war, and a portion of the federal army under General Taylor was ordered to occupy part of the territory claimed by Texas adjoining Mexico. Texas never having been recognized as an independent state by Mexico, no boundary line had been fixed and it was a subject of dispute. Texan settlements had not extended beyond the Nueces River, and between that river and the Rio Grande there were Mexican settlements and military posts. As Taylor advanced to the Rio Grande he was attacked April 25, 1846, by Mexican troops and they were defeated.

President Polk, on May 11, sent a message to Con- gress, 1 in which he recited the negotiations which had followed the annexation of Texas, stated the occasion of Taylor's presence in the disputed territory, and charged Mexico with a deliberate act of war. Con- gress, adopting the language of the President, passed a

1 4 Richardson's Messages, 437.



MEXICAN CEDE!




RRITORY, 1845-48


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joint resolution affirming that, " by the act of the Re- public of Mexico, a state of war exists between that government and the United States." l Although the policy which brought about the war was opposed by a large part, if not by a majority, of the people of the United States, the joint resolution was promptly passed with slight opposition, only two votes in the Senate and fourteen in the House being recorded against it.

The acquisition of the vast territory which was brought about by the Mexican War is a subject which belongs rather to our military history than diplomacy. But such an important event must not be passed over too briefly. For some years previous to the war rumors were from time to time put in circulation that Great Britain was contemplating a new foothold on the Pacific, and, to forestall these designs, as early as 1835 Secretary Forsyth proposed to the Mexican government the purchase of California, but without a favorable response. Some years later Commodore Jones, of the United States navy, in cruising along the coast, re- ceived a report that California had been ceded by Mex- ico to Great Britain, and he thereupon landed a force at Monterey and declared California annexed to the United States; but having ascertained that the report was unfounded he withdrew his force and sailed away. The government disavowed his act as done without authority. 2

The war consisted of a series of continuous victories for the American armies under Generals Taylor and

1 9 Stat. at Large, 9; May 13, 1846.

Ez. Doc. 166, 27th Cong. 33d Sess. vol. 6.


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Scott, and the occupation of the City of Mexico 1 by the latter. Mexico was torn by internal dissensions, due in great part to the machinations of Santa Anna, but its people made a heroic but hopeless resistance, and its government never failed, in its relations with the United States, to bear itself with dignity and cour-


age.


Notwithstanding the large vote by which the war was declared, it was not a popular measure with the American people. There was a feeling that by a more temperate and honorable course it might have been avoided. In this sentiment men of opposite parties like Clay and Webster, Calhoun and Benton, partici- pated. " Why not," exclaimed Benton, " march up to fifty-four forty as courageously as we march upon the Eio Grande? Because Great Britain is powerful and Mexico is weak." 2 Even after the brilliant victories of our armies, in the first general election following the declaration of war, a majority opposed to the adminis- tration was chosen to Congress. When it assembled a resolution was passed by the House that the war with Mexico was " unnecessarily and unconstitutionally begun by the President of the United States." Of this resolution Webster said in the Senate, March 23, 1848 : " I hold that to be the most recent and authentic expression of the will and opinion of the majority of

1 On its occupation by the army, General Scott made a levy upon the city of $150,000 for the benefit of his soldiers. The greater portion of this sum was used under a special act of Congress to found a Soldiers' Home, which now adorns the suburbs of the city of Washington. 9 Stat. at Large, 696.

2 2 Benton's View, 610.


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the people of the United States." * In this Congress there appeared for the first time two members, who were to play an important part in a national drama, of which this war may be properly termed the prelude Abraham Lincoln 2 and Jefferson Davis.

But this sentiment of condemnation did not prevent President Polk from obtaining from Congress all neces- sary measures to prosecute the war with vigor and the ratification of his action when the terms of peace came to be acted upon. After the occupation of Vera Cruz by General Scott, the President determined to send a special commissioner to accompany the army on its march towards the City of Mexico, as he proposed to embrace any opportunity to negotiate terms of peace. The person selected for this mission was Nicholas P. Trist, the chief clerk of the Department of State, who had formerly acted as private secretary to President Jackson and as consul at Havana. He carried with him a draft of treaty prepared by the Secretary of State, Mr. Buchanan. He was treated by General Scott as an unwelcome guest, calculated to interfere with his mili- tary operations, and after reaching the City of Mexico, owing to the indifference of Scott, he had to resort to the good offices of the secretary of the British legation to secure communication and contact with the Mexican peace commissioners. This young secretary, Edward Thornton, years afterwards represented the British government as minister at Washington in a long and honorable service.

1 5 Webster's Works, 274.

2 For Lincoln's speech on the war, 1 Nicolay and Hay's Lincoln, 261.


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When Trist submitted to the Mexican commissioners Secretary Buchanan's terms of peace, they rejected them as onerous and unreasonable. Upon receipt of Trist's report at Washington, he was ordered to cease further negotiations and return to the United States. The President reported to Congress that " his recall would satisfy Mexico that the United States had no terms of peace more favorable to offer; " and that any offers which Mexico might make were to be transmitted by the commanding general to Washington. For some time after Trist received the instructions respecting his recall, no safe opportunity for his return through the enemy's country was afforded, and meanwhile the Mexican commissioners manifested a desire to reopen the negotiations. In violation of his instructions Trist resumed his conferences which resulted in the treaty of peace of February 2, 1848, named, from the village in the vicinity of the City of Mexico where it was signed, Guadalupe Hidalgo. Its terms were substantially those drafted by Secretary Buchanan.

A strange sequel is connected with the negotiations. Trist's failure to proceed to Washington brought from the executive an order for his arrest and forcible re- turn to the United States, but when it arrived he had achieved success in the signing of the treaty and the order was not executed. On reaching Washington, he found that his pay had been stopped from the date of his recall, and that he was dismissed in disgrace from the service. Twenty-two years afterwards this matter was made a subject of investigation, and a report from the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. The re-


FROM THE MEXICAN TO THE CIVIL WAR. 319

port, prepared by Mr. Simmer, with his usual care, is an interesting historical document, containing a review of the negotiations. 1 It says : " Mr. Trist was proud and sensitive. . . . His mission had been crowned with success, but he was disgraced. . . . He determined to make no application at that time for the compensation he had earned, and to await the spontaneous offer of it unless compelled by actual want." The Congress of another generation had learned to appreciate the value of his services to his country, and on April 20, 1871, an appropriation was made in his favor for $14,560. 2

Senator Sumner says in his report that it was un- derstood the President, on the arrival of the treaty, proposed to suppress it; but unwilling to encounter public opinion, which desired peace, he submitted it to the Senate. 3 Enough blood had been shed, and to despoil Mexico of half her territory was sufficient for even the slavery propagandists. The treaty reached the Senate just as its doors were closing, because of a tragic event at the other end of the capitol. The vener- able John Quincy Adams, ex-minister, ex-secretary of state, ex-president, and so long a representative in Congress from Massachusetts, had been stricken down in his seat and lay dying in the rotunda, and both Houses adjourned to mourn with the country over its great loss. His was a singular history, in that after having held the highest posts of honor which the nation

1 S. Rep. No. 261, 41st Cong. 2d Sess.

2 17 Stat. at Large, 643.

8 4 Richardson's Messages, 573; S. Doc. No. 52, 30th Cong. 1st vol. 7.


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could bestow, at the age of sixty-five he entered upon the most brilliant part of his career. Neither as di- plomatist, secretary, or president did he achieve such lasting renown as that which attaches to him as the representative of a rural district in Congress, fighting almost single-handed the battle of the right of petition.

When the Senate reassembled after the Adams obse- quies it entered upon the consideration of the Mexican treaty of peace, and, after a two weeks' discussion and stout opposition, it was ratified with certain amend- ments. Two commissioners were sent to Mexico to secure the favorable action of the Mexican government. On their arrival at Queretaro, the temporary capital, the Mexican Congress had ratified the treaty with the Senate amendments. Before the exchange of ratifica- tions, the American commissioners found it necessary to make certain explanations as to the effect of the Senate amendments upon the treaty, which explanations were reduced to the form of a protocol signed and sealed by the American commissioners and the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs. This protocol was not published with the treaty, but its contents becoming known, the President in response to a resolution, sent the protocol to the House of Representatives, with a message in which he declared that this instrument had no effect whatever upon the treaty, because it had not been submitted to the Senate for ratification. 1

An acrimonious debate followed, in which the Presi- dent and his commissioners were charged with duplicity and bad faith, in securing the final approval of the 1 H.Ex. Doc. No. 50, 30th Cong. 2d Sess.


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Mexican government through a belief in the binding validity of the protocol. The Mexican minister in Washington, who was at the time the Minister of Foreign Affairs who had signed the protocol, likewise engaged Secretary Buchanan in a correspondence on the subject. 1 The latter correctly maintained that the protocol not having been passed upon by the Senate, it could not be held in any way to modify the treaty; but the action of the Executive Department of the govern- ment was of very questionable propriety. 2

The judgment of history is that the annexation of Texas and the consequent Mexican War were brought about for the purpose of strengthening the institution of slavery in the United States. These acts met with strong condemnation in the Northern States. Little palliation for the immense territory taken was found in the fact that the sum of fifteen millions of dollars was paid as a consideration. General Grant echoed the pre- vailing sentiment in the North when he pronounced the war " one of the most unjust ever waged by a stronger against a weaker nation. . . . The occupation, separa- tion, and annexation [of Texas] were, from the incep- tion of the movement to its final consummation, a conspiracy to acquire territory out of which slave States might be formed for the American Union. 3

1 H. Ex. Doc. No. 5, 31st Cong. 1st Sess.

2 For other documents see H. Ex. Docs. Nos. 40, 56, 60, 69, 70, 30th Cong. 1st Sess.

3 Mr. Trist reported to Secretary Buchanan that during the peace negotiations the Mexican commissioners asked that, as the territory to be ceded was now free from slavery, so decreed by the Mexican constitu- tion, a stipulation be inserted in the treaty that it should continue to be


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Even if the annexation itself could be justified, the manner in which the subsequent war was forced on Mexico cannot. . . . The Southern Rebellion was largely the outgrowth of the Mexican War. Nations like indi-

o

viduals, are punished for their transgressions. We got our punishment in the most sanguinary and expensive war of modern times." 1

This is a true but the dark side of the picture. While we wrested this imperial domain from Mexico by conquest and injustice, we took territory from her of which she had made little use; we gave to its few inhab- itants the benefits of our government and civilization; we have made it the home of millions of people; and have developed its great wealth and boundless resources. President Polk, in a message to Congress asking for legislation to carry the treaty into effect and to organ- ize the new Territory, well divining the future impor- tance of this great acquisition, said : " It would be diffi- cult to estimate the value of these possessions to the United States. They constitute of themselves a coun- try large enough for a great empire, and the acquisition is second only in importance to that of Louisiana in 1803. . . . Our future destiny will be without a paral- lel or example in the history of nations." 2

free territory. To this the American commissioner replied that the bare mention of the subject in a treaty was an utter impossibility; that if the territory should be covered all over a foot thick with pure gold, on the single condition that slavery should be excluded therefrom, he could not even entertain the proposition, nor think for a moment of communicating it to the President. S. Doc. No. 52, 30th Cong. 1st Sess. vol. 7, p. 199.

1 1 Grant's Personal Memoirs, 53-56.

2 4 Richardson's Messages, 587.


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While the spirit of slavery extension was the ruling motive which controlled the conduct of our govern- ment in the annexation of Texas and the Mexican War, frankness compels us to admit that another sentiment, in which the American people largely participated, entered into the final result. The extension of the national domain has always been popular in the United States. The prevailing opinion, aside from considera- tions as to the effect on the institution of slavery, was that Texas was destined to become a part of the Ameri- can Union, and no administration would have been pardoned by the people which allowed it to pass irre- vocably from our control. President Tyler reflected this sentiment when, in transmitting the treaty for the annexation of Texas to the Senate, he said : " There exists no civilized government on earth, having a revo- lutionary tender made to it of a domain so rich and fertile, so replete with all that can add to national greatness and wealth, and so necessary to its peace and safety, that would reject the offer." 1 While the oppo- sition party in the House of Representatives had de- clared the war unnecessary and unconstitutional, when the terms of peace came to be agreed upon, no serious thought was entertained of refusing the ceded territory. Said Senator Dayton, a leading member of the oppo- sition : " If the question of no territory was to be made the test, there would be an end of the Whig party before the end of the year." 2

The Mexican War afforded Mr. Buchanan, as Secre- tary of State, little opportunity for diplomatic work,

1 4 Richardson's Messages, 312. * 16 Debates of Congress, 186.


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but it is to his credit that it was so conducted as to avoid any serious complaint on the part of other gov- ernments. The encroachments of Great Britain on the Mosquito Coast, and other portions of Central America, drew from him some pointed declarations respecting the paramount interest of the United States in the Isthmus of Panama, and tending to broaden the application of the Monroe Doctrine. During this term a number of commercial treaties were made, one of which, that with New Granada, or Colombia, in 1846, has had special significance. Its Article 35 contains a stipulation whereby the United States agrees to " guarantee posi- tively and efficaciously . . . the perfect neutrality of the isthmus " [of Panama] and " the rights of sov- ereignty and property which New Granada has and possesses over the said territory."

This is the nearest approach to an alliance or guar- antee of sovereignty made by the United States since its release from the obligations of the treaty with France of 1778. The acquisition of California, and the construction by American citizens of a railroad across the isthmus made this guarantee an important one. Under the article cited it has been held that the United States is authorized and required to protect the transit of the isthmus from foreign invasion, and to compel Colombia to keep the transit free from domestic disturbance. Because of the failure or inability of Colombia to maintain the latter, the government of the United States has, on repeated occasions, sent its naval forces to the isthmus, and landed troops to preserve the peace and secure free transit.


FROM THE MEXICAN TO THE CIVIL WAR. 325

One of the last diplomatic achievements in Mr. Folk's term was the negotiation of a postal convention between the United States and Great Britain, brought about by the rivalry of the steamship lines plying between New York and Liverpool. 1 It marks the beginning of the long list of postal conventions which has made our communication with foreign nations so easy and rapid.

The administration of Polk closed under circum- stances more flattering than any since the successful term of Monroe. He entered upon his duties with an ambition to attain four objects, the settlement of the Oregon dispute, the annexation of Texas, the acquisition of California, and a change in the tariff system, and in all of these he was completely suc- cessful.

Following the Democratic administration of Polk, the Whig party, recovering from the disappointment and disorganization of Tyler's defection, returned to power in 1849, under the presidency of General Zach- ary Taylor, a hero of the Mexican War. The. annexa- tion of Texas and the addition of the vast domain acquired through the Mexican War brought to the country perplexing and exciting questions in connec- tion with slavery, and the administration was mainly absorbed with domestic affairs, but several interesting foreign matters received attention. John M. Clayton, called to the post of secretary of state, was not a man of commanding talent, in this respect falling below several of his recent predecessors; but he had long i 5 Schouler's U. S. 124.


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been a prominent member of the Senate, and was a gentleman of education and culture.

He is best known through the Clayton-Bulwer treaty of 1850, providing for a joint protectorate by the United States and Great Britain over the projected Nicaraguan Canal and for its complete neutralization, and also for an adjustment of questions respecting the British settlements of and protectorate claimed over certain portions of Central America. This negotiation and treaty will be further discussed in connection with the Monroe Doctrine, 1 and it will suffice now to say that from the date of its ratification it has been a con- stant source of discussion and disagreement, and has generally been regarded as the most serious diplomatic mistake in our history.

Taylor's death and the accession of Vice-President Fillmore brought about a change of cabinet, and Daniel Webster, for a second time, was intrusted with the management of our foreign relations. Cuba, which in the past fifty years has been such a perennial source of international trouble, was just then the exciting cause of difference with not only Spain, but also Eng- land and France. FiUibustering expeditions organized in American territory, with apparently little support among the resident Cubans, became so threatening that a proclamation against them was issued in 1849 by President Taylor, 2 and, this proving insufficient, a further one was issued in 1851 by Fillmore. 3 There was a widespread sympathy throughout the country for

1 Infra, chap. sdi.

a 5 Richardson's Messages, 7. . - * Ib. 111.


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the movement, but it was strongest in the Southern States, largely inspired by a hope that it would result in annexation and the increase of the slave power. The efficacy of the neutrality laws was put to a severe test, and the Spanish government was constantly com- plaining of their lax enforcement. The governments of Great Britain and France, sympathizing with Spain, gave instructions to their naval officials to cooperate with the Spanish war vessels in preventing the landing of filibustering expeditions, and this action led to vigorous protest from our government against the exer- cise of police powers by the English and French navies so near to American waters. 1

At a later period in this administration Great Britain and France proposed to the United States a tripartite treaty guaranteeing the possession of Cuba to Spain, and a disavowal of any intention on their part to acquire the island. Edward Everett, then acting as Secretary of State, replied in a lengthy and able letter declining the proposal, which was accepted by succeed- ing administrations as a proper statement of our atti- tude on the status of Cuba. 2

After the unsuccessful landing of several expeditions organized on American territory, the movement col- lapsed with the capture of the leader Lopez and his band, and the prompt execution of a large part of his force, which was mainly composed of Americans. This caused intense indignation in the United States, and at New Orleans the excited citizens in the form of a mob

1 S. Ex. Doc. No. 1, 32d Cong. 1st Sess. pp. 74-82.

2 1 Wharton's Int. Dig. 662.


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attacked and demolished the Spanish consulate, the newspaper office, and various stores and shops of Span- ish residents, without any attempt at restraint by the local authorities.

The Spanish minister at Washington, under instruc- tions from his government, promptly made a demand of reparation for the insult to the flag and consulate, and of indemnity for the losses and injuries sustained from the mob by Spanish subjects. A correspondence with the Secretary of State followed, in which Mr. Webster, in a carefully written and able note to the Spanish minister, recognizing the outrage done to the consulate, offered to make due reparation on that ac- count, but he claimed that the Spanish subjects were entitled to receive no other or greater protection than American citizens, and that they must resort to the local courts for redress of their injuries, either against the individuals who inflicted the wrongs or against the municipality which failed to protect them. 1 As public sentiment was almost entirely on the side of the rioters, the remedy indicated was a virtual denial of redress. While this position has been sustained by such distin- guished successors in the office as Evarts, Elaine, and Bayard 2 as a correct statement of our domestic law, Mr. Webster's sense of justice did not allow him to leave the subject in that condition; and on his recom- mendation Congress, as a matter of grace and comity, voted an appropriation from the national treasury to

1 S. Ex. Doc. 1, 32d Cong. 1st Sess. vol. 1.

2 Evarts, Foreign Relations, U. S. 1881, p. 319; Blaine, Ib. 335; Bay- ard, Ib. 1886, pp. 158-167.


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pay the losses sustained. 1 The precedent then estab- lished has been followed in similar cases. 2

The conduct and correspondence of Secretary Web- ster respecting the New Orleans riot won for him much praise in diplomatic circles. Lord Palmerston, British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in a dispatch to his representative in Washington, wrote : " It is highly creditable to the good faith and sense of justice of the United States government, and the President has more rightly consulted the true dignity of the country, by so handsome a communication, than if the acknow- ledgment of wrong and the expression of regret had been made in more niggardly terms." 3

Another matter having relation to our foreign inter- course, and which attracted great interest throughout America and Europe, had its origin in the Hungarian revolt of 1848, when the democratic uprising threat- ened so many thrones in the Old World. President Taylor dispatched a secret agent to Europe to study the situation, with a view to the recognition of the in- dependence of Hungary if the facts justified it; but before this agent reached Hungary, Russia had come to the aid of Austria and put down the rebellion, and Kossuth and the other Hungarian patriots had found refuge in Turkey. No action was therefore taken by our government, but the documents relating to the sub- ject were sent to Congress by the President, accompa-

1 H. Ex. Doc. 113, 32d Cong. 1st Sess.; 10 Stat. at Large, 89.

2 Chinese, H. Ex. Doc. 102. 49th Cong. 1st Sess.; Italians, For. ReL 1891, p. 727.

2 Curtis's Webster, 556.


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nying his annual message of December, 1849, in which he said, in explanation of the agent's mission : " I thought it my duty, in accordance with the general sentiment of the American people, to stand prepared, upon the contingency of the establishment by her of a permanent government, to be the first to welcome Hun- gary into the family of nations." 1 Whereupon the Austrian charge in Washington, Mr. Hiilsemann, sent a note to Secretary Clayton, protesting against the action of our government as an unjustifiable interference in the affairs of an independent and friendly nation.

The correspondence was in progress at the dissolu- tion of the Cabinet on Taylor's death, and after Web- ster became Secretary of State the charge renewed his protest in more positive language. Mr. Webster's reply, couched in equally positive and scarcely more courteous terms, was a lengthy review of the principles which govern the United States in recognizing govern- ments founded on revolution and popular will, vindi- cated its action in the case under review, and contained a glowing statement of the growth and destiny of the young republic of the New World. 2 It created much enthusiasm among the American people, but it did not escape criticism. A historian characterizes it as " hardly more than a stump speech under diplomatic guise." 3 In a private letter Mr. Webster makes this explanation of its temper : " If you say that my Hiilse- mann letter is boastful and rough, I shall own the soft impeachment. My excuse is twofold. First, I thought

1 5 Richardson's Messages, 12.

  • 6 Webster's Works, 488-506. 1 Rhodes's U. S. 206.


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it well enough to speak out and tell the people of Eu- rope who and what we are, and awaken them to a just sense of the unparalleled growth of this country. Sec- ond, I wished to write a paper which would touch the national pride." *

Probably no paper emanating from the State De- partment ever met with a more widespread popular approval in America. It appeared soon after our suc- cessful war with Mexico and the resultant territorial expansion, and it was in vindication of the nation's sympathy for the cause of republicanism in Europe as represented in the popular hero Kossuth, soon to visit the United States as the guest of the nation. He was, in accordance with a resolution of Congress, 2 brought from his refuge in Turkey on an American man-of-war, praised by the President in his annual message, 3 was presented by the Secretary of State to the President, received by both Houses of Congress with much cere- mony, 4 and his progress through the country was marked by the most enthusiastic demonstrations.

The effect of all these attentions led Kossuth into a serious misapprehension of the proper functions and sphere of influence of our government, and for a time it seemed as if our own people might, through their enthusiasm for this patriot and orator, be likewise led astray. He sought to enlist our government and its citizens in measures for renewed efforts towards Hun- garian independence through political and financial aid.

i 2 Curtis's Webster, 537. 2 9 Stat. at Large, 647.

8 Dec. 2, 1851, 5 Richardson's Messages, 119. 4 10 Stat. at Large, 145.


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But the sober second thought brought our public men and our people back to a sense of the true destiny of the republic, and in this way they were greatly aided by Kossuth's own indiscreet conduct. It soon became apparent that in all this Hungarian business we had departed from the policy marked out by Washington to abstain from intermeddling in the political affairs of Europe, and that our action was inconsistent with the Monroe Doctrine, whereby we sought to exclude Euro- pean nations from extending their political influence on the American hemisphere.

The Hungarian question terminated unfortunately for the Austrian charge, Mr. Hiilsemann. He became quite indignant at the honors bestowed upon Kossuth by the government and its citizens, and he addressed a note to Secretary Webster, protesting against these acts and particularly a speech of the Secretary of State at a banquet given in Washington to Kossuth. To this note Mr. Webster made no reply. Obtaining no satis- faction in that quarter, he called personally on the President, and laid his protest before him. This was followed by a notice from the Secretary of State that the government would hold no further intercourse with him, and that he must confine himself to written com- munications addressed to the Department of State. In answer to this notice he addressed a communication to Secretary Webster, April 20, 1852, stating that his government would not allow him " to remain here any longer, to continue an official intercourse with the prin- cipal promoters of the much to be lamented Kossuth episode." Mr. Webster, in reporting Mr. Hiilsemann's


FROM THE MEXICAN TO THE CIVIL WAR. 333

departure to the American representative at Vienna, states that he was not well informed as to his duty and privileges, as his rank was that of secretary of lega- tion and ad interim charge; that as such he had no right to personally appeal to the President against newspaper criticisms and the unofficial remarks of the Secretary of State, or to converse with the President on matters of business; and that no foreign govern- ment can take just offense at anything an officer of this government may say in his private capacity. 1

The foregoing events made Webster's second term as Secretary of State as famous as his first, but to them is to be added another even more important in its influence on the world. The enterprising American mariner, in navigating the Pacific Ocean in search of new fields for American commerce, had encountered the islands of the Japanese Empire, with its ports closed to foreigners. All their efforts to establish trade or intercourse of any kind had failed, and in case of stress of weather vessels driven on to its coasts had been seized and its sailors maltreated. This unsatisfactory state of affairs had been brought to the attention of the government, and various efforts to remedy it had been unsuccessful. In 1832, an agent of the Depart- ment of State had been dispatched in a naval vessel to the Pacific Ocean, and he was instructed to obtain " in- formation respecting Japan and the means of opening a communication with it; " but nothing came of this mission. In 1845, Commodore Biddle was directed to visit Japan and ascertain if its ports were accessible. 1 S. Ex. Doc. No. 92, 32d Cong. 1st Sess.


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He entered the port of Yeddo (Tokio), but was told by the authorities that it was the immemorial policy of the country to exclude foreigners from its ports and from trade. Four years later another American commodore went to Nagasaki to secure the release of some ship- wrecked sailors, and he reported that he thought it " a favorable time for entering upon negotiations with Japan."

This report being brought to Secretary Webster's attention, he prepared instructions for the Navy Depart- ment, in June, 1851, which in November, 1852, were transferred to Commodore Perry, who was dispatched with an adequate naval force to compel an audience with the Japanese authorities; and he bore credentials authorizing him "to negotiate and sign a treaty of amity and commerce between the United States and the Empire of Japan." He entered the Bay of Yeddo with his fleet, and by firm persistence succeeded in concluding a treaty, March 31, 1854, by which two Japanese ports were opened to trade with the United States, and a consul was authorized to be appointed. 1 This event is referred to by Secretary Seward as the time " when we gently coerced Japan into friendship with us," and it was the first step in the opening of Japan to the world, as similar treaties were soon after negotiated by other Western nations.

In some respects Mr. Webster is the most noted of the Secretaries of State. Others have had longer ser-

1 For reports and details of these events, S. Ex. Doc. No. 59, 32d Cong. 1st Sess.; S. Ex. Doc. No. 34, and H. Ex. Doc. No. 97, 33d Cong. 2d Sess.


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vice, have ably dealt with more intricate and important questions, and have contributed more to the volume of international law and diplomatic precedents. But his services and fame as secretary shine with the reflected light of his greater reputation as a lawyer, legislator, and orator. His personal appearance and qualities likewise contributed to his fame. His was a command- ing physique, of large frame, massive head, raven black hair, broad forehead, deep-set piercing eyes, and swarthy complexion. His dress, of the old Revolutionary colors of blue and buff, also lent attraction to his person. A witticism is credited to Sydney Smith that Webster " was a living lie, because no man on earth could be so great as he looked." 1 He closed his earthly career in 1852, while still secretary, soon after he had been rejected by his party convention as its candidate for president, a soured and disappointed statesman. But he was one to whom that high office could bring no greater fame. As long as brilliant and skillful diplo- macy is admired, as long as the Constitution of the United States endures, as long as English literature is read, so long will Daniel Webster be remembered.

On the accession of Mr. Pierce to the presidency in 1853, William L. Marcy became Secretary of State. He possessed large experience in public affairs, serving as governor of New York, for successive terms as senator, and as secretary of war under Polk, but he was best known as a partisan leader. It was he who first made in a public debate in the Senate the an- nouncement " To the victors belong the spoils," and of

1 Moore's American Congress, 244.


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whom it has been said that he would rather be wrong with his party than right without it. It is due to him, however, to say that, while in domestic affairs of that stirring period he was a strict partisan, his manage- ment of our foreign relations was marked by exalted patriotism and a high order of ability.

Matters of more than ordinary importance occupied his attention. Among the first of these was one that reawakened the interest of Americans in the Hungarian cause, which had died away with the disappointment and departure of Kossuth. Koszta, a Hungarian refu- gee, had declared his intention to become an American citizen, but before his naturalization was perfected he went to Turkey on business, and while in Smyrna was arrested and placed on board an Austrian man-of-war in the harbor. His release was demanded by the Amer- ican consul on the ground that he had taken the first step toward his citizenship. Meanwhile Captain Ingra- ham arrived in the port with an American naval vessel and asked for Koszta's delivery, under threat of resort to force unless released within a given time. It was finally arranged that he should be placed in custody of the French consul, until his case should be settled between the two governments. A correspondence fol- lowed in which Secretary Marcy fully sustained the action of the consul, and his course was enthusiastically indorsed by the American people. Koszta was ulti- mately released, without prejudice to the conflicting claims, and he returned to the United States. The attitude of our government has, however, been some- what modified on the question, and the action of a


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Consul in such a case would now be sustained, if at all, rather upon the ground of an acquired domicile than of a claim of citizenship. 1

The subject of naturalization and expatriation has been the occasion of much diplomatic correspondence and controversy on the part of the government of the United States with European powers. From the begin- ning of our national existence we have encouraged immigration; liberal laws for the naturalization of for- eigners have been passed; and the right of expatria- tion has been maintained. In this branch of interna- tional law the attitude of the United States has had a marked effect upon the practice of nations. One of the chief causes of the War of 1812 was because of the impressment of seamen, naturalized citizens of British birth, taken from American vessels. The old common law doctrine was that no British subject could denationalize himself, and that he owed perpetual alle- giance to the crown; but the persistent claim of the United States was finally recognized by Parliament in the naturalization act of 1870. The doctrine of expa- triation is now generally accepted by the nations of the world, and the United States has succeeded in having it embodied in many of its treaties.

One of the most useful achievements of Mr. Marcy was the negotiation of a reciprocity treaty with Canada. From the time that the Provinces acquired the right to regulate their own tariff in 1845, various efforts had been made, through negotiations and proposed recip-

1 For official documents, H. Ex. Doc. No. 1, 33d Cong. 1st Sess. pp. 25-52; H. Ex. Doc. 91; and S. Ex. Doc. 53, same session.


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rocal legislation, to place the relations of the neighbor- ing countries on a better and freer commercial basis, but nothing came of them. Finally, in 1854, Great Britain empowered Lord Elgin, then governor-general of Canada, and afterwards famous in the Orient, to come to Washington and enter upon direct negotiations with the Secretary of State. He was accompanied by the Prime Minister of Canada and a full staff of experts and assistants, and was cordially welcomed by our government. After a careful study of the subject a treaty was agreed upon and proclaimed, providing for the free exchange of a list of articles, mostly natural products, the reciprocal privilege of fishing in territo- rial waters, and the use of the rivers and canals on equal terms. The effect of the treaty was to largely increase trade between the two countries.

One of Lord Elgin's secretaries, in a book of remi- niscences published many years after the event, gives quite a graphic account of the negotiations, and boast- fully claims a masterly triumph for British diplomacy. 1 He narrates how Mr. Marcy informed Lord Elgin, on his arrival, that, although he was favorable to the de- sired treaty, there was no chance to get it confirmed by the Senate, because his own party senators were opposed to it. The noble lord thereupon undertook to convert the democratic senators by social courtesies and cham- pagne. After ten days of dining and wining, the British diplomatist informed Secretary Marcy that he could assure him that the necessary majority in the

1 Episodes in a Life of Adventure, Lawrence Oliphant, p. 40; Me- moirs of Lawrence Oliphant, 120, 130.


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Senate was now secured, whereupon the plenipotentia- ries set to work to prepare the treaty. He describes the completion of the final draft and signing of the treaty in the hours after midnight, when the decrepit and drowsy secretary, " far gone in years/' was " being done by an English lord," and modestly records : " We were tremendously triumphant; we have signed a stun- ning treaty." Upon such imaginary facts, unfortu- nately, the record of history is too often made.

At the end of its term in 1865 the treaty was termi- nated in accordance with a resolution of the Congress of the United States, but that action was influenced more by the unfriendly conduct of Canada during our Civil War than by the results of the reciprocity. It was defective, but there was a strong sentiment in Con- gress to have it revised and continued, and it is most probable that this would have been done but for the resentment existing in the North because of Canadian sympathy with the rebellion. 1 Canada's folly cost her a most advantageous trade relation with her neighbor, which might have continued indefinitely. Her repeated efforts to regain it have thus far proved fruitless.

An apparently trivial instruction issued by the Secre- tary of State soon after he entered upon his duties was the subject of much discussion and criticism, and its echoes are still heard at this day; for a time it even threatened the good relations of our ministers at more than one European court. Mr. Marcy, in familiarizing

1 For debates in Congress, Congressional Globe, 38th Cong. 1st Sess. Pt. 3, pp. 2333-38, 2452-56, 2502-09; 2d Sess. pp. 35, 95-97, 204-206. For Joint Resolution of Congress, 13 Stat. at Large, 566.


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himself with the service, found that a uniform had been prescribed by the department for our diplomatic representatives on state occasions, and being a man of plain, democratic habits and principles, he sent them a circular letter recommending them to appear at court "in the simple dress of an American citizen," though he failed to inform them just what that dress was. It was received by the ministers at European courts with dismay, as they well knew what was before them.

The experience of Mr. Buchanan, our minister at London, will illustrate their situation. He reports to Secretary Marcy that soon after the circular became public through the comments of the London papers, he made the acquaintance of Queen Victoria's master of ceremonies, who manifested much opposition to the minister's appearance at court in " the simple dress of an American citizen," and said that of course he could not expect to be invited to court balls and dinners. 1 Presently he received an invitation from the master of ceremonies to the opening of Parliament, but as the invitation contained a printed notice " that no one can be admitted to the diplomatic tribune . . . but in full uniform," Mr. Buchanan did not attend. His absence was the subject of general comment in the London press, and caused quite a sensation in society. 2 The minister finally solved the momentous problem by con- senting to buckle a black-hilted dress sword on his usual dress suit, and thus accoutred he was graciously received by the Queen and her court. He wrote : " I

1 2 Curtis's Life of Buchanan, 107.

  • S. Ex. Doc. No. 31, 36th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 16.


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confess that I never felt more proud of being an Amer- ican than when I stood in that brilliant circle, in ' the simple dress of an American citizen/ " and he adds : " Many of the most distinguished members of Parlia- ment have never been at court because they would not wear the prescribed costume." l Mr. Marcy encoun- tered much ridicule on account of his circular, but the American people have indorsed it by enacting a similar provision into a law of Congress now in force. 2

Pierce's administration is noted as the heyday of the filibuster. " Young America " was then rampant and the spirit of slavery extension was reaching out for new territory to the South. The strange career of a notori- ous character, William Walker, a native of Tennessee and an adventurer in California, illustrates the spirit of the period. His first experience as a filibuster was an attempt to detach Lower California from Mexico, but his expedition proved a failure. He a second time organized a band of adventurers at San Francisco, and, championing the cause of a local revolutionist, he made a descent upon Nicaragua, and succeeded in gaining control of the government of that little republic. He issued a decree legalizing slavery, and sent a priest, Father Vigil, as minister to Washington, where he was received by President Pierce. 3 But Walker's success was only temporary, as the outraged people of Nicara- gua drove him from the capital, and he and his Ameri- can followers were only saved by the interposition of a

1 Ib. 19.

2 U. S. Revised Statutes, sect. 1688. 8 5 Richardson's Messages, 373.


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United States naval vessel, which carried them away from the country.

Another prominent propagandist of the extension of American influence over territory to the south of us was Quitman, a general of the Mexican War, late governor of Mississippi, and then a congressman-elect. He was planning new attempts on Cuba. These events brought out protests from Mexico, Central America, and Spain, and proclamations from the President, fol- lowed by half-hearted efforts at the enforcement of the neutrality laws. But the most distinguished and one of the most able of the advocates of southern expansion was Pierre Soule, a fiery Southerner, who had been sent as minister to Spain, with instructions to negotiate for the purchase of Cuba.

Soule had a romantic history. A native of France, he had, as a plotter against the established government while a young man, been held as a prisoner of state. Escaping to America, his talents soon gave him a pro- minent place in the politics of Louisiana. Having in- curred the deep-seated hostility of Louis Napoleon, on his way to his post at Madrid, he was not permitted to tarry in France, but was required to pass through its terri- tory under surveillance. In the Spanish court he had to contend against the French influence, headed by the mother of the Empress Eugenie, the French ambassador, the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, with whom when minister in Washington Soule had quarreled, and other high officials. Soon after his arrival, owing to a supposed affront offered to Mrs. Soule, two duels were fought, one between Soule's son and the Duke of Alva,


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brother-in-law of Louis Napoleon, and the other be- tween Minister Soule himself and the French ambassa- dor, in which the latter was severely wounded and lamed for life.

It may well be inferred that under such circum- stances little progress had been made towards the pur- chase of Cuba. But following soon upon the duels came the news of the seizure in Havana of an Ameri- can merchant vessel, the Black Warrior, charged with violations of the customs laws or port regulations. Owing to the arbitrary conduct of the Cuban authori- ties, the master of the vessel felt compelled to abandon her to the latter. When the news reached Washington it caused considerable excitement, but it was mainly confined to the slavery element, as the North was too deeply engrossed with the Kansas-Nebraska question to manifest much indignation over an event calculated to enhance the prospect of the annexation of Cuba. The President sent a message to Congress, communicating the event and stating that a demand for indemnity had been made upon Spain. 1 The instruction sent to Min- ister Soule was to demand an indemnity of $300,000; the President's hope was expressed that the Spanish government would visit with its displeasure the Cuban officials, and that " as early a reply as practicable " should be obtained.

Soule felt that his opportunity had arrived. In the first instance he called upon the Spanish minister, re- hearsed the facts in the case, and left with him a note in which he closely followed bis instructions. 2 Three days

1 H. Ex. Doc. 76, 33d Cong. 1st Sess.

2 H. Ex. Doc. 93, 33d Cong. 2d Sess. p. 69.


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having passed without an answer, he sent a second note, in which he intensified and exceeded his instructions; to the demand for indemnity he added the requirement that all persons concerned in the wrong should be dismissed from the service, and that these demands should be complied with in forty-eight hours. 1 The secretary of legation, in delivering the note to the Spanish minister of state, pointed to the clock, then exactly at twelve, and indicated that in precisely two days the answer would be due. These notes reached the foreign office during holy week, when it is not usual to dispatch business, but the day after the second note was received, April 12, 1854, a reply was sent by the minister couched in the best style of the proud Castilian. Careful attention, it said, would be given to the affair when full information was received; it was unreasonable to expect that so grave a case should be determined upon the hearing of one side only; and it was added that the Spanish government was "not accustomed to the harsh and imperious manner with which this matter has been expressed; which, further- more, is not the most adequate for attaining the amica- ble settlement which is wished for." 2

Soule could do nothing but forward this reply to his government, though he fully anticipated it would bring instructions to break off diplomatic relations. When this correspondence reached Washington the excite- ment had completely died out; the Black Warrior had been released, with great marks of consideration on the part of the Cuban authorities; and the warlike 1 H. Ex. Doc. 93, 33d Cong. 2d Sess. p. 70. 2 Ib. 73.


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instructions which Soule expected were never sent. In the heated state of the country over the slavery question in Kansas, such a case could not be exagger- ated into a cause of war; and Marcy, the experienced politician and cool-headed Secretary of State, left his excitable minister to fret at Madrid over his silence. 1

But another opportunity soon opened to Soule to exploit his expansion schemes. While Marcy was not ready to plunge the country into war because of the provocation just narrated, he was quite anxious to bring about the annexation of Cuba, and he cherished the delusion that it could be accomplished by pur- chase. Accordingly he instructed Soule to join Mason, our minister in Paris, and Buchanan, minister in Lon- don, in a conference with a view to concerting some plan for the acquisition of Cuba, in a way that would overcome the opposition of France and England, and would satisfy both the honor and cupidity of Spain. The three envoys met in October, first at Ostend and afterwards adjourned to Aix-la-Chapelle, and the result of their conference was the issuance of a remarkable document, mainly the work of Soule, known as " The Ostend Manifesto/' It set forth the reasons which impelled the United States to desire the acquisition of the island, why Spain should yield to this desire, and why the transfer would redound to the benefit of the European governments and commerce. The price, it stated, should not exceed a certain maximum sum, which was not inserted, but it is understood was fixed at $120,000,000; and it was intimated that if Spain 1 Ib. 105, 107.


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should refuse this liberal offer, the United States would be justified " by every law, human and divine," in tak- ing the island by force. 1

Soule was highly elated at his success in bringing his colleagues, Mason and Buchanan, to his views, but he was destined a second time to have his hopes dashed by his chief. When the " manifesto " reached Marcy's hands he at once saw the fatal error into which the en- voys had fallen, and in an instruction to Soule plainly indicated his dissent from the course indicated. He affected to believe that the envoys did not " recommend to the President to offer to Spain the alternative of ces- sion or seizure," then proceeded to argue against such a proceeding, and notified Soule that if the Spanish government was not willing to entertain a proposition for a peaceful purchase, the negotiations should not be further pressed. 2 Upon receipt of this dispatch Soule felt that he could no longer serve under a secretary of state who so constantly frustrated his plans, and he indignantly tendered his resignation.

The sentiment in the United States was generally averse to the " manifesto." Even the Southern expan- sionists felt that the envoys had overreached them- selves. In the North the anti-slavery press was not stinted in its condemnation. It was styled " atrocious in its recommendations; " the " manifesto of the brig- ands;" and that it meant: "If Spain will not sell Cuba, we must steal it." In Europe our reputation for statecraft was greatly tarnished by Soule's conduct and this document. The London Times, in discussing the

1 H. Ex. Doc. 93, 33d Cong. 2d Sess. p. 127. 2 Ib. 134.


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subject, echoed the prevailing judgment when it said : " The diplomacy of the United States is certainly a very singular profession." *

The Crimean War brought us into diplomatic con- flict with Great Britain, because of the attempt of the minister and consuls of that country to carry on enlist- ment for the British army at various places in the United States in disregard of the laws, and their con- duct led to the dismissal of the minister and the consuls at New York, Philadelphia, and Cincinnati. Crampton, the British minister, had long resided in the United States, was popular in society, and greatly liked by members of the Cabinet. 2 His offense was that, in conjunction with the consuls at the places named, he had conducted an extensive system of recruiting for military service, in plain violation of the neutrality laws of the United States. An opportunity was afforded the British government to transfer him to another post, but this it declined to do, and no alternative was left the Secretary of State but to send him his passport and require him to leave the country. 3 The incident occasioned much excitement in England, and its press demanded the dismissal of the American minister at London, but the offense was too clearly established to justify retaliation.

At the conclusion of the Crimean War the confer- ence of European powers, which joined in the peace, also united in a series of declarations at Paris in 1856,

1 2 Rhodes's U. S. 43.

2 1 Life of Jefferson Davis, by his wife, 569.

For official documents, H. Ex. Doc. No. 107, 34th Cong. 1st Sess.


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which they designed, by the adhesion of other nations, to have incorporated into the recognized code of inter- national law. These rules were, briefly stated, (1) the abolition of privateering; (2) the exemption from seizure of an enemy's goods under a neutral flag; (3) a like exemption of neutral goods under an enemy's flag; and (4) that a blockade, in order to be valid, must be effective.

All these but the first had been long advocated by the United States. The first was plainly in the interest of nations having a strong navy, but Mr. Marcy agreed to accept it with an amendment of the rules exempting the private property of individuals, except contraband, from seizure on the high sea by naval vessels in time of war. The amendment was not accepted by Great Britain, and our government declined to give its ad- hesion to the declarations. 1 Subsequently when the Civil War began and our commerce was threatened by rebel cruisers, our government proposed to give its unconditional adhesion to them, 2 but Great Britain and France declined, except on condition that the rules should not be applied during the war of the Kebellion. 3 Verily in diplomacy, as in the ordinary affairs of men, " circumstances alter cases."

During the recent war with Spain our government made a public announcement of its intention to ob- serve the rules of Paris in the existing war, 4 and they

1 For official correspondence, H. Ex. Doc. No. 1, 34th Cong. 3d Sess. pp. 31-44.

2 3 Wharton's Int. Dig. 273. Ib. 233. 4 President's Proclamation, April 26, 1898.


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were likewise observed by Spain. These rules may now be regarded as accepted by all the maritime nations, and we may look forward with reason to the adoption of the addition proposed by Secretary Marcy, which, it will be remembered, when more than a century ago it was advocated by Dr. Franklin, was derisively termed the " Philosopher's Dream." * It has again received executive approval in the annual message of President McKinley of 1898, in which he asks the indorsement of Congress and such legislation as will enable him to convoke a conference of the nations with a view to its universal acceptance.

The last presidential term before the Civil War was filled by James Buchanan, a man well equipped for dealing with international and diplomatic matters, but the absorbing character of the domestic questions which brought on that conflict greatly influenced his conduct even in foreign affairs, and barred the way to the real- ization of most of his exterior plans.

He chose as Secretary of State, Lewis Cass, of Michigan, who had served as minister to France, had been for many years a conspicuous figure in the Senate, and eight years before had been the unsuccessful Democratic candidate for President. Although a man prominent in his party, his selection was mainly dictated by friendship, as he was seventy-five years of age and naturally of a somewhat indolent temperament. Presi- dent Buchanan records that he had virtually to be his own Secretary of State. 2

Two matters which had received much attention

1 See supra, chap. iii. p. 93. 2 2 Curtis's Buchanan, 399.


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from the preceding administration continued prominent in this, viz., Cuba and the Nicaragua filibustering. The co-author of the " Ostend Manifesto " could hardly be expected as president to omit any opportunity to bring about the annexation of the " Pearl of the Antilles/' and his minister to Spain was instructed to advance the project as far as possible. In his annual message of December, 1858, he urged upon Congress the importance of the acquisition, and asked that, fol- lowing the precedent in the purchase of Louisiana and the Mexican additions, an appropriation be made to be used in the negotiations; 1 whereupon a bill was intro- duced in the Senate placing at the disposal of the President $30,000,000. This brought on a lengthy debate, in which the slavery and anti-slavery elements were arrayed against each other, and, while there was apparent a decided majority for the measure, the oppo- sition was so strenuous it was not possible to secure action before the adjournment. The next elections gave the anti-slavery party a majority in the House, and made legislation on that subject impossible; but the appropriation would have been futile, as Spain refused even to receive a proposition for purchase at any price.

Walker, the filibuster, we have seen, had been once driven out of Nicaragua, but, not daunted by this dis- comfiture, he renewed his project from New Orleans. The state of affairs seemed to favor success. The de- velopment of our Pacific coast possessions made the isthmus transit of the greatest importance, and the 1 5 Richardson's Messages, 510, 642.


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Americanization, as it was termed, of Central America was a favorite phrase with the President and his party. This high official even went so far as to write a letter to a Walker meeting in New York, commending his " heroic efforts " in behalf of Nicaragua. But when the latter' s plans developed into a plain violation of the neutrality laws, it became necessary to instruct the federal officials to prevent the departure of his expe- dition. The sympathies of the officials and populace were, however, largely with Walker, and he was en- abled to get away with his band of adventurers and land at Greytown in Nicaragua. But his conduct there was of such a flagrant character that the American naval officer of that station felt compelled to land a force, which arrested Walker, and brought him a prisoner to New Orleans. The affair was made the subject of a special message by President Buchanan, 1 who charac- terized the conduct of the naval officer as "a great error; " and it was severely criticised by the Southern expansionists. For a fourth time Walker was permitted to organize an expedition and sail for Central America. He landed on the coast of Honduras, where he and his force were captured, his followers sent back to the United States, and Walker's career was ended by his military execution.

The isthmus question was made more prominent by the neglect of the British government to observe the stipulations of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, as interpreted by the United States, in the continuance of its pro- tectorate over the Mosquito Indians on the eastern 1 S. Ex. Doc. 13, 35th Cong. 1st Sess.; S. Ex. Doc. 63, same Sess.


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coast of Nicaragua. Mr. Buchanan had sought an ad- justment of this matter when minister in London, and as president he had the satisfaction of bringing it to a conclusion by the relinquishment of the British claim. 1

A further advance in the removal of outstanding differences with Great Britain was made in the final surrender of all claim of right of search of American vessels. For many years that government had ab- stained from any claim of impressment of seamen from American vessels, the main cause of the War of 1812, and its contention at this time was limited to a visita- tion of vessels simply to ascertain whether they were engaged in the slave trade, which was unlawful under both domestic law and treaty. In 1842, when Mr. Cass was minister in France, he had protested vigor- ously against the Webster- Ashburton treaty because it did not provide against that practice, 2 and now as secretary of state he brought the whole power of the government into play to prevent it, and secured from Great Britain a formal surrender of any such claim.

It was heralded by the administration as a great diplomatic triumph, and it was a consistent result of our attitude from the organization of the government on the immunity of the vessel carrying the American flag; but our triumph would have been a more gratify- ing one if the cause which brought it about had been more worthy. Owing to the largely increased demand for slave labor in the Southern States and Cuba, a fresh incentive had been given to the universally pro-

1 5 Richardson's Messages, 442, 639.

2 See supra, chap. yiii. p. 288.


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scribed traffic in African slaves, and the British gov- ernment had increased its naval patrol in the waters about Cuba with a view to stopping the growing traffic. About this time a cargo of African negroes had been openly landed in Savannah, and every effort to enforce the laws against the master of the vessel had failed, owing to the sympathy of the people of Georgia. The British naval vessels claimed the right to visit sus- pected slavers to determine their character, and did exercise it against several American vessels in these waters, and this brought out the protest of Secretary Cass and his diplomatic triumph. 1

The present century inherited from the Middle Ages a diplomatic controversy almost as strange as that settled by Decatur's guns with the Barbary pirates of the Mediterranean, 2 which, greatly owing to the stout resistance of the United States, came to an end in Buch- anan's term. When this country assumed its place among the nations, it found the kingdom of Denmark examining all vessels and collecting dues from them and their cargoes passing to and from the Baltic Sea through the sounds or great belts connecting that sea with the ocean, and this practice had been acquiesced in by all the maritime nations for centuries. In the time of Secretary Clay as many as one hundred Ameri- can vessels, engaged in the Baltic trade, were paying this tribute, but all that he and the succeeding secre-

1 5 Richardson's Messages, 507, 640; S. Ex. Doc. 59, 35th Cong. 1st Sess.; H. Ex. Doc. 2, 35th Cong. 2d Sess.; S. Ex. Doc. 2, 36th Cong. 1st Sess. pp. 51-90.

2 See supra, chap. vi. p. 205.


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taries could accomplish was a reduction of the dues. In 1843, Secretary Upshur, in a communication to the President, said : " Denmark continues to this day, with- out any legal title, to levy exceedingly strange duties on all goods passing the sound. Denmark cannot lay claim tp these duties upon any principle either of na- ture or the law of nations, nor for any other reason than that of antiquated custom. . . . For the United States the time has come when they can appropriately take decisive steps to free their Baltic trade from this pressure."

But a change of secretaries, and the interest and excitement incident to the annexation of Texas and the war with Mexico, postponed any decisive action. Dur- ing the presidency of Pierce notice was given of the termination of the treaty which regulated these dues, and its action was seconded by that of various Euro- pean governments, by whom a conference was called on the subject. The United States declined to take part in the conference, on the ground that it was un- willing to recognize any right belonging to Denmark to collect this tribute, and the only payment we could make was by way of compensation for any expendi- tures made by Denmark for the improvement and safety of commerce. The conference agreed upon the capitalization of the dues in one aggregate payment, which was carried out pro rata by the European nations. The share proportioned to the United States was fixed at $1,050,000, which our government refused to pay, but it finally consented, in 1857, to the payment of $393,000, in consideration of an agreement on the


FROM THE MEXICAN TO THE CIVIL WAR. 355

part of Denmark to maintain lights, buoys, and pilot- age in the sounds. 1 And thus, in great measure through the persistency of the United States, another mediaeval burden upon commerce was forever removed. During this period the affairs of Mexico had fallen into a wretched condition of disorder. The Liberal party was struggling against the Clericals to secure a government free from ecclesiastical domination, and the country was distracted throughout its* extent by fratricidal war. As a result foreigners of all national- ities suffered in person and property, and international claims were accumulating on that account. President Buchanan sent an able representative in the person of Eobert M. McLane to investigate the contest, with authority in his discretion to recognize the Liberal gov- ernment, at the head of which was Juarez. The latter had been expelled from the capital, and was found by Mr. McLane at Vera Cruz, where he established diplo- matic relations with him, and soon negotiated a treaty and convention securing transit privileges across the isthmus of Tehuantepec, and an advantageous trade arrangement, in return for which the United States was to pay the Liberal government $4,000,000, with half of which American claims were to be satisfied, the other half to be used for the restoration of the Liberal government to power. It was virtually an alliance with one of the parties contending for supremacy in Mexico. While these negotiations were in progress, the President sent a message to Congress, calling attention to

1 For official correspondence, H. Ex. Doc. 108, 33d Cong. 1st Sess.; S. Ex. Doc. 28, 35th Cong. 1st Sess.


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the condition of the country, which he described as " a wreck upon the ocean, drifting about as she is impelled by different factions/' and he asked for authority to employ a military force to enter Mexico for the purpose of enforcing our claims and respect for our government. 1 In making this recommendation, he said if such action was not taken " it would not be surprising should some other nation undertake the task, and thus force us to interfere at last, under circumstances of increased diffi- culty, for the maintenance of our established policy."

But Mr. Buchanan's spirit of territorial acquisition was too well known to secure either for the treaties or his message any favorable action. The presidential contest of 1860 was then on, the great Civil War was impending, and Juarez and his republican adherents in Mexico had to content themselves with our moral sup- port till the deadly struggle against slavery was termi- nated, and we were once more free to vindicate the Monroe Doctrine.

1 5 Richardson's Messages, 538, 563, 644.

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